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APPEALS ON THE MERITSD
By TERENCE G. ISON*

This article deals with the limitations of judicial review and the possibilities of
its augmentation or replacement by a regime of appeals on the merits. The
author questions some assumptions that are commonly made about appellate
structures. He criticizes the "broad-brush approach" and warns that there is
no panacea. The article explains why any broad regime of appeals on the
merits from tribunals to courts of general jurisdiction is not an available
option, and it discusses alternative structures of appeals to tribunals. Finally, it
explains why it would be irresponsible to propose any appellate structure
covering any substantive subject except in the context of a comprehensive
study of that subject.
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I. INTRODUCTION
From time to time, and perhaps more commonly in recent years,
the suggestion has been heard that judicial review should be accompanied or replaced by a comprehensive regime of appeals on the merits
from the decisions of tribunals and other government agencies)
This article includes comments on the desirability of appeals, but
its primary objectives are:
1. To identify some key factors that are relevant to the choice of
appellate structures.
2. To suggest the optimum processes through which decisions
about appellate structures can be made.
3. To invite reflection upon some common assumptions,
particularly the assumptions:
- that appeals are a good thing;
- that the adversary system has a natural superiority over
inquisitorial or other processes; and
- that courts of general jurisdiction are the institution of primary
choice for appellate functions, at least at the upper level of an
appellate structure.
While there is no consensus about the meaning of "appeals on
the merits," many or most of the complaints stimulating a demand for
such appeals relate to the inadequacies of fact finding in primary
adjudication, the resolution of judgmental questions, and the abuse or
underuse of discretionary powers. If it is to respond to these complaints,
therefore, an appellate body must have the capacity and the willingness
to engage in fact-finding inquiries, to resolve judgmental questions and
to exercise discretionary powers, as well as to determine questions of
law. For example, the jurisdiction of the Administrative Appeals
Tribunal in Australia includes a complaint about the exercise of a dis-

I For example,

this proposition underlay the creation of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal

in Australia. See also K.J. Keith, "Appeals From Administrative Tribunals: The Existing Judicial
Experience" (1968-1970) 5 V.U.W.L.R. 123 and Legislation Advisory Committee, Administrative
Tribunals (Report No. 3) (Wellington: Queen's Printer, 1989). This matter was also on the agenda

of the Commonwealth Law Conference held in Auckland in April 1990.
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cretionary power, and the Tribunal is authorized2 to substitute a different
decision by exercising the discretion differently.
Any tribunal that is to perform this role with optimum efficiency
would probably need the willingness and the capacity to proceed by a
review of the record, field investigations and a hearing de novo, though
not with all features of each in every case. The parties and the appellate
body could refer to the record established at first instance and other
documents on the file of the adjudicating agency, and could also adduce
new evidence.
More restricted appellate structures are obviously possible, but
the more restricted the less they are compatible with the notion of
appeals on the merits.
The vocabulary of this article reflects a conviction that perspicacity in this subject area tends to be inversely proportionate to the use
of the word "administrative."
II. THE DESIRABILITY OF "APPEALS ON THE MERITS"
It is hard to argue in support of such appeals without
belabouring the obvious. Any decision-making process will involve some
risk of error, and the correction of at least some errors may be achieved
through an appellate structure. Moreover, when primary adjudication is
final, there may be a risk of decisions being made in a way that is
capricious, responsive to improper pressures, or otherwise indifferent to
statute law. Hence, the mere existence of an appellate structure may
enhance fidelity to statute law, and in other ways too it may help to keep
them honest.
Appeals on the merits might also provide an intelligent vehicle
for system development. Statutes are commonly passed in a skeletal
form, sometimes leaving the detailed rules to subsequent adjudication.
Developing those rules can involve a selection among policy options; but
when the rules are made by a court on judicial review, or on a limited
type of appeal, the matter is commonly perceived as one of "statutory
interpretation." Policy choices are then made by a modus operandi that
2 For further discussion, see for example, Law Reform Commission of Canada, The
AdministrativeAppeals Tribunal ofAustralia by T.G. Ison (Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of
Canada, 1989).
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can be incredibly superficial, and that generally excludes any cost/benefit
analysis of the alternatives. A regime of appeals on the merits could
help to prevent that from happening. To achieve that goal most effectively, however, any new appellate structure would have to replace
judicial review.
Some of the disadvantages of appellate structures are also
obvious, such as the cost. Responsible advocacy of any new appellate
structure must include an appraisal of whether the costs are going to be
worth it. In some situations, there is no comparative value judgment to
be made: the cost may make a new appellate structure entirely negative
in its impact. For example, an education department might be willing to
fund a scholarship program for students as long as the selection process
can be administered cheaply, albeit with some arbitrariness. If, through
the creation of a new regime of appeals on the merits, disappointed
candidates had a right of appeal, the response could be to terminate the
program.
Even at best, the costs of an appellate structure must come from
limited resources, and public as well as private funds may be diverted
from the pursuit of other social goals. Nor can it be assumed that these
costs will necessarily result in any higher quality of justice. For example,
in some situations, the availability of an appeal might simply create a
bias in favour of those best able to afford the appellate process.
Moreover, the argument that appellate structures tend to constrain the
abuse of power could sometimes be misconceived. It is commonly
thought that the risk of such abuse tends to increase with the degree of
power. Where, therefore, an appellate body is more powerful than the
institution of primary adjudication, the introduction of an appellate
structure could enhance rather than mitigate the risk of such abuse.
As well as the direct costs, there may be indirect costs that are
less easily recognized or measured. For example, the existence of an
appellate structure might cause the agency of primary adjudication to
engage in additional record keeping, slower proceedings, and the
production of reasons for decisions that are more prolix (and perhaps
less comprehensible).
Another disadvantage of appeals is the delay in achieving final
decisions; sometimes with damaging consequences. For example, in
workers' compensation and in other systems of disability insurance, a
delay in claims adjudication can delay rehabilitation; but this does not
mean simply that the commencement of rehabilitation is postponed.
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Delay commonly results in permanent damage to rehabilitation
prospects. This is particularly noticeable in bad-back cases. Similarly in
business affairs, a substantial delay in settling the legal position can
sometimes inflict irreparable harm, including harm to people who are
not parties to the dispute.
In some systems of public law, primary adjudication has
commonly been abysmal. For example, this has been so in several of our
social insurance and revenue systems, and in some of our regulatory
bodies. If lawyers are involved, it is usually at appellate stages; and this
may explain why, in any discussion of system reform, the legal profession
tends to focus on appeals. However, the basic problems with primary
adjudication are often inherent in the structure, and they are not
remedied by having some of the decisions reversed on appeal. To focus
on appeals can, therefore, become a diversion from, rather than a
remedy for, the problems of primary adjudication. If the reasons for the
deficiencies in primary adjudication are analyzed, it will often be found
that a new appellate structure would not be the optimum response.
In a social insurance system, for example, primary adjudication
may be highly automated. That is probably an optimum structure for
most cases, but some require a careful gathering and synthesis of the
evidence, discussion by the decision maker with the parties and others,
sometimes field-work inquiries, and sometimes a careful consideration
of medical, legal, and policy issues. Where a case requires this kind of
attention, however, the need does not suddenly arise on appeal; it was
there in the first place. Responding to this need by adding another layer
of appeal can mean that primary adjudication remains abysmal and is
only mitigated by adding more judgmental variables at the appeal stage.
The result can be a regime of unequal justice, favouring those who
persist in the appellate process to the detriment of those who acquiesce
in primary decisions.
A more effective reform would be a screening process to identify
the cases that require the more sophisticated attention, so that they can
receive that attention in primary adjudication. The conduct of each
matter should be entrusted to someone with the authority and the ability
to make decisions at whatever level of sophistication may be required,
and to make all necessary communications prior to and after the
decision. This must include personal investigation and the receipt of
evidence and argument first hand. In subject areas where the volume is
high, it is only when primary adjudication has been designed to reach the

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[YOn. 30 NO. 1

right answers in the first place that an appellate structure has a
reasonable chance of working well to correct the occasional errors.
With regard to regulatory agencies, appellate structures also
have downside risks. One example appeared in news reports in 1990. A
fire was burning out of control at Hagersville, Ontario. It was in a dump
of about thirteen million tires. Toxic smoke rose from the fire and the
oil that it produced may have percolated into neighbouring wells.
Hundreds of people fled their homes. Over a year previously, the
Ministry of the Environment had issued an order for the dump to be
cleaned up, but the operator had made the order the subject of appellate
adjudication. It is no surprise that during the fire, the Minister of the
Environment complained that the operator could have spent his
resources on cleaning up the dump rather than on legal process.
It is not a purpose of this article to attempt any overall
assessment of the social utility of appeals, or to complete a catalogue of
their advantages and disadvantages. Nor have the disadvantages been
mentioned to suggest that appeals are always counter-productive. They
are mentioned simply to explain why, in any consideration of appellate
structures, the option of "no appeals" should not be ruled out.
There appears to be a broad consensus that any system of
appeals from the decisions of government agencies (including tribunals
and government departments) should generally be confined to those
decisions of government that can be seen as adjudicative in character.
Thus, appellate structures are not generally advocated for decisions
made in the preparation of legislation or in international diplomacy; or
for decisions relating to the maintenance of buildings, the preparation of
budgets, the awarding of contracts, et cetera.
Even with regard to decisions that are commonly or sometimes
perceived as adjudicative, there are many in respect of which a right of
appeal could be counter-productive. These might include:
1. Decisions made in complex situations, perhaps involving multiple parties, where adjudication is by a costly and sophisticated
process that includes procedural fairness. In some jurisdictions,
decisions relating to the licensing of television and radio stations
might be an example.
2. Decisions made between parties or groups with such unequal
resources that an appellate structure could simply give an unfair
advantage to one party or group.
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3. Rationing decisions, for example, relating to grants, prizes,
appointments, promotions, and some scholarships.
4. Decisions that require a balance to be struck between a
concentrated private interest and a more dissipated public
interest, and where appeals would only be taken one way,
thereby creating a distortion against the public interest. With
respect to licensing systems and pollution control, for example,
more levels of appeal could simply add to the chain of people
who have a power of veto over action that might be taken in the
public interest. Moreover, if the political or bureaucratic
pressures operating on primary adjudication already create a
distortion in favour of a private interest, an appellate structure
might result in one distortion being compounded, perhaps
synergistically, by another.
5. Decisions of a tribunal that was composed to achieve a balance
of sectional interests: for example, a labour relations board.
6. Licensing decisions of a type where eligibility depends upon a
performance test, such as driving licences. An opportunity to be
retested might be more appropriate than a right of appeal.
7. Decisions of a tribunal that has been specially constituted to
make an expert judgment: for example, a panel of medical
specialists.
8. Decisions in the exercise of a discretion. Such decisions
commonly are considered suitable for appeals on the merits,
though in some situations, there may be little to be said for
having the discretion of one person substituted for that of
another. If a matter is so important that the discretion should be
exercised at a higher level, it would usually be better to have the
case elevated to that level in the first place rather than on
appeal. Even with regard to discretionary powers, however,
there may be situations in which an appellate structure can
provide a corrective influence; such as where primary adjudication is subject to an improper political pressure from which
the appellate body is immune.
9. Decisions of a tribunal which is itself an appellate body at the
apex of a decision-making structure, so that the addition of
another level of appeal would create an unnecessary increase in
the number of decision-making levels.
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For situations in which an appeal on the merits is considered
desirable, it may be helpful to consider the institutional possibilities.
III. THE CHOICE OF FORUM
A. Courts of General Jurisdiction
As appellate bodies, courts are generally perceived in the legal
profession as having a greater legitimacy than other tribunals. They may
also enjoy a greater immunity than some other appellate bodies from
some types of political or other pressures. For many reasons, however,
courts of general jurisdiction have no capacity or potential as a forum for
any broad regime of appeals on the merits.
One problem is that the cost, delay, and formality of legal
processes in the courts can create an inequality of access that is
incompatible with any ideal of equal justice. Even for cases in which
these factors do not impede access, they can cause significant damage.
Many tribunals were created in the first place to avoid these problems,
and it would be counter-productive to introduce them in an appellate
structure.
In other ways too, appeals to the courts would be incompatible
with the rationales for the creation of tribunals. By establishing a variety
of tribunals, legislatures adopted a pluralistic patchwork. In so doing,
they decided, among other things, that adjudicative power should be
distributed more widely. The goals, values, and methods to be applied in
these tribunals were not to be those of a legal elite, but were to be drawn
from broader sections of the community. Appeals to the courts would
tend to defeat that democratizing move.
Related to this, the courts are still oriented in the protection of
private interests, commonly corporate interests. While the influence of
private law has been moderated by the influence of CanadianCharterof
Rights and Freedom 3 litigation, this has not diminished, and it may have
enhanced, the focus on private interests. Statutes for the protection of
long term public interests tend to be seen in the courts as aberrational.
Often a balance has been struck in the legislative process between public
3 CanadianCharterofRights andFreedoms, Part I of the ConstitutionAct, 1982, being Schedule
B of the CanadaAct1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].
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and private interests, and the legislation provides for the refinement and
detailed application of that balance in subsequent adjudication. If a
tribunal has been established for that purpose, any regime of appeals to
the courts would create a risk of shifting that point of balance against the
public interest.
Again, disputes about government decisions often result from
ambiguities in statute law. The intelligent resolution of such disputes
commonly involves policy choices. When such a matter goes to a court
that is unfamiliar with the subject, however, it is sometimes treated as "a
question of interpretation." The use of that term allows questions of
policy development to be decided without advertence to the
consequences, and without any reasons for decision that relate to the
significance of what is being done.
An unfortunate example of "legal reasoning" can be seen in a
trilogy of cases that went to the Supreme Court of Canada on
occupational health and safety. 4 The question was whether the
provinces have any jurisdiction in relation to occupational health and
safety in respect of those industries that lie within federal regulatory
jurisdiction for labour relations and other purposes. The Court decided
in the negative. If this question were to be decided with a sense of
purpose, one would surely expect the reasoning to include at least an
appraisal of:
1. Exactly what the problems are in occupational health and safety,
including the fundamental causes of occupational disablement
and premature death;
2. What types of regulatory and enforcement action are most likely
to reduce the casualty and severity rates;
3. Which level of government can provide that kind of action;
4. If the answer to three is both, then which is in the best position
to provide that kind of action; and
5. Whether health and safety achievements would be greater by
concurrent or by single jurisdiction.
Only the last of these points was mentioned, and none of them was
addressed seriously in lengthy judgments that proceeded by legal
reasoning.

4 Commission de la sante et de la securiti du travailv. Bell Canada, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 749;
CanadianNationalv. Courtois,[1988] 1 S.C.R. 868; AlltransExpress v. Workers' CompensationBoard
ofBritish Columbia, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 897.
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Even if such a hazardous process is inevitable in the role of the
courts as the arbiters of federalism, it would not be in the public interest
to have decisions on other aspects of public law also made without
advertence to the significance of what is being done.
The choices made in appellate adjudication often involve policy
options, and they are an integral part of system development. When the
options relate to system design, an intelligent process for making the
choices often requires the co-ordination of law making, budgeting, and
executive action. Usually it requires long term planning and sometimes
it also requires co-ordination with other government agencies. It is this
ongoing and co-ordinating responsibility, with a perception of
consequences and an awareness of interactions, that makes the ordinary
courts generally unsuitable as policy makers in public administration.
Moreover, consistency and coherence in system design and policy
development can be difficult to maintain if the process is subject to
intermittent interventions by a body that is variable in its composition,
has different reference points, a different range of vision, possibly
different values, and no continuous responsibility for further decisions.
A related concern is the procedures used in courts of general
jurisdiction, and the influence that courts can have on the procedures of
other bodies. Many subject areas were excluded from the courts in the
first place for legitimate reasons that included apprehensions about the
appropriate model for adjudication. For example, it may have been
decided that adjudication in a particular subject area should not be by an
adversarial process. 5 It may have been decided to use primarily inquiries
initiated by the decision maker, perhaps including field-work. Various
systems were adopted for decision making by tribunals and other
agencies, and the resulting procedural diversity was only partly
accidental. To a large extent, that diversity reflects deliberate planning
to achieve particular goals in different subject areas. Those goals could
well be threatened by appeals to a court that would, almost inevitably, be
a homogenizing influence in favour of the adversary system and to the
disparagement of procedural diversity.
Where the adversary system is inappropriate in primary
adjudication, it may also be inappropriate for any appeal. The matters
decided by tribunals and other agencies often involve multiple public
5 See, for example, British Columbia, Report of the Commissioner by Charles W. Tysoe
(Victoria: Queen's Printer, 1965) at 353-55.
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and private interests which have been accommodated by the procedures
of the agency. Some of these interests would never be represented by
advocacy at a hearing. It would seldom be an improvement to have such
decisions subject to appeal to a court that is geared to the adversary
system, that usually insists upon a respondent, and that usually functions
at its best in a context of bilateral conflict.
Another concern relates to the talent that can be attracted for
tribunal positions. Appeals to the courts could tend to enhance a
perception of tribunals as "inferior." Indeed, that deprecating term has
long been used by the courts. Yet the presiding role in some of our
boards and commissions involves a mixture of adjudicative, executive,
and legislative functions, and it may include policy planning, coordination, and implementation. Where this is so, the demands upon a
board president can require an intellectual calibre higher than that
which is commonly found in judicial appointments. Brighter people may
be unwilling to accept such appointments if their decisions, made in the
context of long term planning and complex interactions, are subject to
disturbance by episodic interjections from people who do not have that
breadth and length of vision, or that depth in the subject. Thus appeals
to the courts could mean a downgrading of the calibre, the structural
options, and the potential achievements of many boards and
commissions.
Another concern about appeals to courts is the risk of a further
decline in the notion of justice according to law. There has been a
retreat from that notion, particularly over the last thirty years. In private
law subjects, doctrinal rules are being eroded by an expansion of judicial
discretion. In judicial review, the erosion of fidelity to law came even
earlier when the courts substituted judicial discretion for legislative
sovereignty, particularly in overriding the privative clauses. 6 With the
Charter,the validity of all statutes and regulations is now a matter of
judicial discretion. The resulting paradox is that we are moving in the
direction of more lawyers but less law.
This concern is particularly relevant to the high volume subjects
in which decisions are made by tribunals or other agencies. Those

6 These were the statutory provisions that gave a tribunal exclusive jurisdiction to determine
all issues of law and 'fact arising under the act creating the tribunal, and forbade the review of a

tribunal decision in any type of court proceedings. The courts refused to read those sections to
mean what they said.
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responsible for system design must determine to what extent decisions
should be made by predetermined criteria and to what extent the
outcome should be a matter of discretion. In deciding how many
variables the system can accommodate and how much (if any) discretion
is optimum, the designer must consider questions of administrative and
adjudicative feasibility and of aggregate cost, as well as individual rights
and public policy objectives. This breadth of vision may result in the use
of categories that subsequently appear too rigid to a judge of general
jurisdiction, particularly if the court has detailed evidence of sympathetic
circumstances in the particular case. Thus if a court really exercised an
appellate jurisdiction "on the merits," there could be a temptation to
substitute judicial discretion for justice according to law, and to produce
a result that could not, and probably should not, be applied in other like
cases. An improvement might have been achieved in the quality of
justice in one case, but only at higher adjudicative cost, only by
sacrificing equality before the law, and perhaps also by sacrificing other
social goals.
In social insurance systems in particular, a more sophisticated
regime might be achieved by adding more variables to the criteria of
eligibility; but a higher proportion of the aggregate budget may then go
to administration and adjudication, with a corresponding reduction in
benefits. A good maxim in the design of social insurance is "try to keep
it simple." That goal could be sacrificed if appeals on the merits really
were decided by courts of general jurisdiction. Indeed, it may well be a
recognition of this that sometimes persuades the judges themselves to
restrict their role when cases relating to social insurance systems go to a
court on judicial review or on appeal.
Moreover, courts, and particularly appellate courts, are more
centralized than many other agencies of government. Any appellate
structure could be decentralized more fully if the appeals lay to a body
that was not a court. If an appellate body is to be accessible to ordinary
people, if it is to resolve issues of credibility, or if its work involves
questions of medico-legal interaction, it is crucial that its operation be as
local as possible.
There would, in any event, be an overriding difficulty in any plan
for appeals on the merits to courts of general jurisdiction. There is no
way of providing for it. Legislative attempts to confer a broad appellate
jurisdiction on a court in relation to a tribunal have commonly met a fate
similar to that of the privative clauses. Judges like to define their own
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jurisdiction, and with regard to the scope of their own functions, they
commonly decline to be bound by statute law. Privative clauses enacted
by legislatures to curtail the jurisdiction of the courts have commonly
been overridden or discarded on judicial review, and the judges have
substituted their own judgment on the scope of their jurisdiction.
Conversely, when legislatures have provided for an unrestricted appeal
from a tribunal to a court, the judges have tended to shrink the scope of
that appellate jurisdiction to a point at which it is indistinguishable from
judicial review. 7 Reid and David have stated: "Numerous judgments
attest to the tendency of courts to construe narrowly powers of appeal
from tribunals. Even explicitly broad powers may be cut down, for the
courts appear to prefer a narrowly supervisory role rather than one of
general review. Thus, despite the grant of extensively wide appellate
powers, courts will usually prefer to interfere only where there has been
an error of jurisdiction, or of law or principle, or mistake of fact, and will
refrain, if possible, from substituting their opinions for the tribunal's,
particularly that of an expert tribunal."8
Nor should this be surprising. The desire of judges to maintain
control over the scope of their own functions is not whimsical. As well
as reflecting a power struggle, it may reflect a perceived need for
efficiency in the use of their time. Any public institution, including a
court, must ration the allocation of its resources. Traditionally, this has
been done in courts by delay, cost and formality, as well as by confining
the range of issues that can be adjudicated. It has sometimes been done
by confining any appellate role of courts to questions of jurisdiction and
law.
The areas to be covered by any new regime of appeals on the
merits would be fact finding, judgmental issues, and discretionary
powers. Judges are often willing to decide such matters if the issue
relates to a penalty, or some other question that seems familiar to a

7 See, for example, Union Gas v. Sydenham Gas, [1957] S.C.R. 185. Subject to a leave
requirement, the statute allowed an appeal from the Board to the Court of Appeal "upon any

question of law or fact." That is the broadest prescription of appellate jurisdiction that is normally
used in legislative drafting. Yet the Supreme Court of Canada decided that no appeal would lie on

a question of public convenience and necessity.
8 R.F. Reid & H. David, Administrative Law and Practice,2d ed. (Toronto: Butterworths,

1978) at 453.
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courtY In other cases, however, judges are reluctant to enter these
areas, not only because of the resources required, but for other reasons,
such as the need for consistency and a lack of expertise in the subject
area.
Since a reassessment of "the merits" commonly requires an investigation of the facts, any appellate body that is to perform that role must
have the authority and the willingness to reconstruct the facts, and that
must include a willingness and perhaps an obligation to conduct an
evidentiary inquiry. It is this role that is repugnant to the tradition of
common law courts in relation to appeals. Thus, any statutory creation
of a broad appellate jurisdiction on the merits would not prevail against
the necessity to ration scarce resources and the traditional perceptions
of judges about the nature of their appellate roles.
Courts are more willing and able to conduct an evidentiary
inquiry when an appeal lies to a single judge; but that can have the
disadvantage of substituting individual for group values. For this as well
as other reasons, it is not generally appropriate for an appeal from a wellconstituted and specialist board. However, it can be viable for appeals
from some government agencies in some subject areas, particularly
where primary adjudication is by a single official in a government
department.
B. Courts of Specialized Jurisdiction
Many of the problems mentioned above could be overcome by a
regime of appeals to specialized courts, but that is not usually an
available option. The provinces have no constitutional power to appoint
judges of superior courts, and in the federal system, there has been a
strong tradition against the creation of superior courts of specialized
jurisdiction.1 0
If such courts could be created for public law functions, however,
they would have several advantages over courts of general jurisdiction.
The most obvious are expertise in the subject and the absence of

9 See, for example, College ofPhysicians and Surgeons of Ontariov. Gillen (1990), 1 O.R. (3d)
710.
10 For example, the refusal to create a separate court of admiralty and the blending of federal
adjudication into one federal court structure.
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competitive pressures within the institution for the allocation of
resources to cases in other subject areas. Compared with tribunals, a
superior court of specialized jurisdiction would have the advantage that
it could be empowered to make final decisions about the scope of its
own jurisdiction. Indeed, this structure would have the greatest
potential for avoiding review by courts of general jurisdiction.
C. General or Specialized Appellate Tribunals
To whatever extent that it may be desirable to have appeals on
the merits to a tribunal, should it be one of broad jurisdiction (that is,
multi-subject) or one specializing in a particular subject? The relevance
and cogency of the arguments vary from one subject to another, and it
would be a mistake to assert any overall conclusion.
An appellate tribunal of broad jurisdiction may achieve more
independence than a specialized tribunal from political or departmental
pressures. Also, if the primary decision maker is a regulatory body that
has been captured by the industry that it is supposed to regulate, a
specialized appellate tribunal may be vulnerable to the same capture.
However, there are sometimes good reasons for preferring a
specialized appellate body. A tribunal of broad appellate jurisdiction
might be attended by lawyers whose expertise lies in the processes of the
tribunal rather than in a substantive subject. A specialized tribunal may
attract lawyers who specialize in the laws and policies of the substantive
subject, and it may also attract specialist lay advocates. Advocacy from
these groups may be more focussed on the law of the subject, the merits
of the case, and the public policy objectives of the system. Moreover,
because of its concentration on a particular subject area, a sectoral
appellate tribunal may be more sensitive to unrepresented interests.
Also, subject area concentration may facilitate familiarity with the detail
of a system so that a sectoral appellate tribunal is able to make a final
disposition of a case more often, with fewer references back for further
decisions by the agency of primary adjudication.
Specialization might also facilitate the use of procedures that are
tailored to the subject area. For example, in health and safety matters, it
is sometimes crucial that decisions be made quickly; that there be no
adjournments or delays, at least not without making an interim order. In
some other subject areas, it may be in the public interest, or at least
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harmless, to proceed at a slower pace. A tribunal of broad jurisdiction
might find it difficult to operate at differing speeds in relation to
different subjects. In other ways too, a broad appellate jurisdiction
might create a damaging pressure against procedural diversity.
Where it is considered desirable to include interest group
nominees in the composition of a tribunal, that can probably be
accommodated more readily if the tribunal is one of specialized
jurisdiction. Also, in relation to some subject areas, it may be desirable
to have a tribunal that is primarily appellate but which has some original
jurisdiction. 11 That too may be easier to accommodate in a specialized
tribunal.
Specialization may also be more appropriate where a series of
decisions must be made over time and where consistency and
coordination are important. Business licensing may sometimes be an
example. A specialized appellate tribunal may also be more appropriate
where decisions of an adjudicative nature are interwoven with field-work
and the provision of services. Examples can be found in rehabilitation of
the disabled.
Sometimes adjudicative decisions may be interwoven with
departmental or political policies; for example, in transport. It could be
legitimate to have a sectoral appellate structure that has some
connection, properly recognized by statute, with the development of
departmental or government policy.
Other arguments could favour sectoral appeals in relation to
some subjects but a tribunal of broader appellate jurisdiction in relation
to others. For example, the expertise required for appellate adjudication
in some subjects might be designed more readily into a specialized
tribunal. In other subject areas, the reverse could be true. Related to
this is the resolution of appeals from the exercise of discretionary
powers. Some of these decisions might be made most intelligently by the
breadth of vision that is more likely to be found in an appellate tribunal
of broad jurisdiction, while others could be made more intelligently by
the depth of expertise that is more likely to be found in a specialized
appellate body.
Similarly, with regard to speed and economy, there is no a priori
reason why an appellate body of broader jurisdiction would be more or
less expensive, or faster or slower, than specialized appellate bodies,
11 For example, the Workers' Compensation Appeals Tribunal in Ontario.
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though it may be so in particular subject areas. The same could be said
of decentralization. The larger caseload that a tribunal of broader
jurisdiction could attract may facilitate decentralization; but in some
subject areas, a specialized tribunal might be able to decentralize more
effectively, perhaps using local part-time members.
Similarly, with regard to equality, it might seem that a tribunal of
broad jurisdiction would produce a more even quality of justice for
people and corporations in different socio-economic groups; but this
could be an illusion. For example, inequality of access would be created
almost automatically by the location of the tribunal. Certain needs and
interests might be served by having it on the fifteenth floor of an office
tower in the business section of a city, while other needs and interests
would be served by locating the tribunal at a suburban shopping centre.
IV. AN ADVERSARIAL OR INQUISITORIAL MODEL
The suggested advantages of an appellate tribunal (rather than a
court of general jurisdiction) are generally the converse of the points
mentioned under heading III.A. above. In particular, one could expect
(or at least hope) that a tribunal would be more accessible, more
economical, more expeditious, more cognizant of multiple or public
interests, and more willing to review the merits, including the facts and
the exercise of discretionary powers. It would also probably show a
higher standard of deference to statute law.12 Another advantage of a
tribunal is the option of proceeding on an inquisitorial rather than an
adversarial model. That is the option being discussed under this
heading.
Following the experience of the prerogative courts, it became a
common law tradition to denigrate and even to despise inquisitorial
processes; but modem tribunals using such procedures are a far cry from
the Star Chamber and the Court of High Commission. The features of
an inquisitorial model that might be advantageous to certain types of
inquiry include economy, speed, the coalescence of investigation
(including field-work) with adjudication, initiative in the seeking of
evidence, the use of public funds to obtain evidence, the reduction of
controversy by the use of tribunal experts, and the avoidance of
12

This was a noticeable feature of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal in Australia.
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therapeutic damage from the controversial nature of adversarial
proceedings. An inquisitorial process can also be more accommodating
to multiple interests, and in particular, more sensitive to interests that
would not be represented in any adversarial process.
Where a tribunal is intended to function on an inquisitorial
model, this must be reflected in the qualifications for appointment, the
location of the tribunal, the physical plant, staff, budget, and procedures.
The tribunal would not depend upon advocacy, but advocacy would be
permitted and it would play a supplementary role. Paradoxically,
advocacy can sometimes be more effective in the context of an
inquisitorial process. The more discursive interaction can enable the
advocate to understand more clearly the concerns of the tribunal, and
vice versa. To ensure that prompt appellate decisions operate as a
quality control device in relation to primary adjudication, any attempt at
conciliation by the tribunal should generally be prohibited.
The file used in primary adjudication should usually form part of
the material considered by the appellate body, and so should any manual
of adjudicative criteria used in primary adjudication. Any sloppiness or
other deficiencies in reaching initial decisions would then be exposed to
the corrective and deterrent influence of the appellate tribunal. It would
also be more difficult for decisions in primary adjudication to be made
according to a regime of secret law.
While an appeals tribunal established on an inquisitorial model
can have great potential, its political feasibility probably depends upon
whether the proposed tribunal is one of specialized or general
jurisdiction. 13 The predisposition of the legal profession and the
influence of the courts in favour of the adversary system are so strong
that the use of an inquisitorial model, or any other procedural
alternative to the adversary system, has to be justified; and it is generally
difficult to produce any justification except in the context of a particular
subject area.

13 In Australia, it is not considered politically feasible for the Administrative Appeals Tribunal
to function on an inquisitorial model, and that is so regardless of any judgment on the value of that
model in relation to any subject.
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V. WHETHER SECTORAL APPEALS SHOULD BE EXTERNAL
OR INTERNAL
Where a specialized appellate structure is created for a
particular subject, it must be decided whether the appellate tribunal
should be external (i.e., outside the agency of primary adjudication) or
internal (i.e., within the same agency as primary adjudication). Where
there is a pyramid structure with two levels of appeal, the most common
argument is that the final level should be external, but a more cogent
argument could often be made that the intermediate level of appeal
14
should be external.
While it is customary to assume and assert that an external
appellate body must be superior to an internal one, there is commonly
no basis for that conviction. Neither structure is superior in every
respect. My experience in this relates primarily to workers' compensation in Canada. While experience in, and impressions from, these
systems may not have universal significance, they may well be of general
interest.
A. Advantages of an External Appellate Body
External appellate tribunals generally hold hearings, or at least
recognize a right to a hearing upon request. This right has not been
recognized so consistently by internal appellate bodies. Related to this,
it is normal for the decisions of external appellate tribunals to be made
by the people who conducted the hearing. That has not always been the
case with those internal appellate bodies whose members are part of or
closely related to the line-management structure.
External appellate bodies sometimes enjoy a greater immunity
from political pressures. They may, therefore, achieve a higher standard
of fidelity to law. However, this immunity may be limited to the honeymoon period.
Even basic fact finding in a government agency can be distorted
if it is subject to political pressures, or to institutional isolation and
intellectual incest. The latter can take an insidious form if the opinions
14

For an example of this structure, see the Workmens' CompensationAmendment Act, S.B.C.

1973, c. 92.
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of an internal expert are always accepted at face value and without crossexamination. If the same expert dominates at all levels of adjudication,
the result may be worse than the denial of any right of appeal. External
appellate bodies have done much to solve this problem in workers'
compensation.
Also, because external appellate bodies do not have administrative responsibilities, they may focus more effectively on the role of
adjudication, including the identification of issues of law and fact, and
any problems of medico-legal interaction.
External appellate bodies generally give better reasons for
decision, though they are often verbose. Also, they sometimes read as if
they were written for a court on judicial review. This undermines their
value as explanations to the parties or as guidance for primary
adjudicators.
An advantage often claimed for an external appellate structure is
that it will be independent of primary adjudication; but that is a red
herring. The ordinary court system is often revered as a model; yet, the
independence of appellate courts from primary adjudication is in some
ways less than that of an internal appellate body in a tribunal structure.
A court of appeal may be separated from a trial court in the statutes and
in other formal documents, but the two courts may blend in other ways.
For example, the judges are appointed in the same way, they come from
the same profession, usually the same socio-economic background, and
they may be on the same social circuit. The two courts may share the
same building and some of the same support services. Yet these features
are not generally considered to impair the validity of that appellate
structure. With an internal appellate body in a tribunal structure where
an appeal lies, to the commissioners of a board, the appeal may be to
people who are geographically separated from the primary adjudicators,
who come from a different professional background, who are appointed
in a different way and who may (in relation to any particular appeal)
have a broader outlook.
Obviously it would be objectionable if the adjudicators or the
managers of primary adjudication could direct or control the appellate
body, but internal appellate structures need not and commonly do not
operate in that way. For example, where the final appeal lies to the
commissioners of a board, the appellate body may be giving direction to
primary adjudication, not vice versa. In that respect, the structure may
be similar to the ordinary court system in which appellate bodies give
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direction to primary adjudicators with regard to the criteria to be
applied.
B. Advantages of an Internal Appellate Body
Internal appellate bodies have generally been more expeditious.
Indeed, the incredible delays of some external structures have frustrated
the achievement of policy objectives, such as income continuity and
rehabilitation.
An internal appellate structure also promotes consistency at all
levels of adjudication. Since the final appellate body has executive responsibility in relation to primary adjudication, it can ensure that the
precedents established in the appellate process are followed. Moreover,
external appellate bodies do not have a constant vision of the larger
volume of cases being decided in primary adjudication. Hence they may
tend to introduce more judgmental variables than the system can
accommodate. The result may be either to make the system excessively
complicated, or to produce unequal justice by applying different criteria
at the final level of appeal from those applied in primary adjudication.
Tvo bodies of law then emerge, one for cases decided in primary
adjudication and another for cases decided on appeal.
Related to this, appellate adjudication is sometimes policy
making. Thus, in the exercise of their quasi-legislative roles, an appellate tribunal and the agency of primary adjudication might pursue
conflicting policies if they are not under common direction.
An internal appellate structure can also facilitate the use of
appeals as a medium for quality control in primary adjudication. Where
a decision is reversed on appeal, the tribunal can consider what caused
the error in the first place and whether some change is required in
primary adjudication. For example, a change may be required in
relation to instructions, training, qualifications, personnel selection,
workload, records systems, working conditions, or whatever. Because an
external appellate body has no executive responsibility in relation to
primary adjudication, it tends to focus more exclusively on getting the
right answer to the case under appeal. It has, therefore, less potential as
a beneficial influence on the quality of primary adjudication. Moreover,
because an internal appellate structure can play this role of quality

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL 30 NO. 1

control, it can also tend to facilitate the decentralization of primary
adjudication.
The creation of an external appellate tribunal can also weaken
the range of people who can be attracted as executives in relation to
primary adjudication. Where appeals are external, the management of
primary adjudication is likely to be seen as primarily an administrative
function and, therefore, as requiring someone with a managerial/administrative background. Such a person may be less sensitive to fidelity to
law, procedural fairness, the therapeutic significance of procedural
options, and other requirements for a good quality of adjudication.
With an internal appellate structure, where the president of the
appellate body also has an overriding executive power in relation to
primary adjudication, this diversity of functions can make the combined
role more attractive than either role on its own. Also, because many of
the executive functions do not require fixed-time appointments, appeals
can be scheduled at short notice. In some conditions, therefore, this
structure may facilitate the hearing of appeals without delay.15
Internal appellate bodies also seem better at preserving
informality, and at avoiding unnecessary adjournments or preparatory
steps. Moreover, although internal appellate bodies sometimes fail to
hold hearings when required, external appellate bodies sometimes hold
unnecessary hearings.16 Internal appellate bodies may also be less dependent upon advocacy and more inclined to engage in field-work. Where
that is so, the focus may be less on the documents and more on the
realities.
Again, defects in the substantive law of the subject that are
discovered by appellate bodies can sometimes be remedied most readily
by a concurrence of adjudicative experience and regulation-making
power. 17 It can be exasperating for an applicant to be told that the
tribunal recognizes the injustice being suffered but has no power to
prescribe a remedy. Cynicism among the clientele of the system is an
understandable consequence if the only people by whom they have an
15 This is the way that it worked during my term as Chairman of the Workers' Compensation
Board of British Columbia.
16 That is, where no hearing has been requested by any of the parties and no need for a
hearing is apparent to any member of the tribunal.
17 For example, Re the Measurement ofPartialDisability:Decision No. 8 (1973-74), 1 workers'
Compensation Reporter 27 (W.C.B.B.C.).
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opportunity to be heard are people who announce that they have no
power to rectify an injustice. This problem can be minimized if the final
level of appeal is internal and is blended with the responsibility for
regulation making.
Internal appellate bodies also seem better at achieving finality
issues in dispute. They can respond to all issues that are
all
for
outstanding at the time of the appellate adjudication. External appellate
tribunals are sometimes confined to issues that have been determined in
primary adjudication, or at an intermediate level of appeal. Thus an
external appellate structure can produce interagency ping-pong.
Finally, internal appellate structures generally operate at a lower
cost.
It may sometimes be possible to capture most of the advantages
and of external appellate structures by making the
internal
of
intermediate level of appeal external and the final level internal. If the
intermediate appeal is normally final on questions of fact, the parties
would know that the conclusions of fact have been freed from any
pressures that might operate in the internal system. At the same time,
the final appellate tribunal would be able to develop a coherent body of
law and to ensure that its decisions are followed in primary adjudication.
Those decisions would probably also be followed at the intermediate
level of appeal. The problem of conflicting policy sources might then be
avoided.
VI. MAKING THE DECISIONS ON APPELLATE STRUCTURES
This article is not written to promote further discussion of
appeals on the merits. Indeed, one of its goals is to warn against any
treatment of appeals on the merits as a discrete subject. The risk is that
such discussion might lead to commissions of inquiry making
recommendations relating to appeals in the abstract, rather than in a
study of a substantive subject. To promote any appellate structure as a
panacea that can be spread with beneficial effect across the full range of
adjudicative decisions made by government would be no more intelligent
than to believe that nineteenth century market theory can be spread with
beneficial effect across all government functions.
One concern is that any study that was limited to appellate
structures would have a wrong emphasis. Since impact analysis would be
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impeded by the lack of a subject area context, general principles or
ideological aspirations would probably receive a benevolent weighting;
and "reasoning" could easily become a substitute for inquiry.
Conclusions could then be reached in a way that was flippant, or at least
indifferent to the significance of what was being done. Uniformity
would probably have an undue influence, and for all of these reasons,
public policy objectives would be likely to suffer. Moreover, the extent
to which procedural and institutional diversity are useful or senseless
could not be judged fairly in a study that was limited to appellate
structures and which, therefore, would have a bias in favour of
uniformity. For these reasons, as well as others, a broad-brush approach
to appeals on the merits could be seen as partisan in the arena of
political conflict. It might also be seen as special pleading for the legal
profession.
Other forms of bias are also likely to occur in any broad-brush
approach. For example, a demand for appeals on the merits can be
nurtured by assertions of general principle, but objections to such
appeals would usually depend upon evidence that is subject-specific, and
which is therefore unlikely to be produced except in the context of an
inquiry into a substantive subject. Moreover, the development of such
evidence may depend on expertise in disciplines other than law, while
the broad-brush approach is most likely to be adopted, if at all, in an
inquiry conducted by lawyers.
The introduction of appellate structures where they may be
inimical to the public interest is not the only risk with the broad-brush
approach. Even where a new structure of appeals on the merits could
operate with beneficial effect, it may still be less than an optimum
response to the problems of adjudication in a particular system, and it
could become a diversion from more realistic ways of solving those
problems. For example, in workers' compensation in Canada, it has
been a perennial problem that the compensation boards have commonly
not complied with the statutes. A likely explanation is that the incidence
of political power is different in the legislative process from what it is in
subsequent administration and adjudication. The failures to comply
with the Acts reflect ongoing political pressures not to comply. The
problem was alleviated only slightly by judicial review. It has been
alleviated further by the new external appeals tribunals; but the problem
persists. The primary need is for an analysis of the political pressures
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operating on the boards and of the structural changes that would be
necessary to alleviate those pressures.
This is one example of a broader point. The significance of
appellate structures cannot be understood in isolation from policy
making, regulation making, finance, economic and political pressures,
triggering devices, investigative techniques and strategies, the nature and
structure of primary adjudication, and sanctions. Any study of these
matters requires a concentration on a substantive subject, including the
adjudicating agency, its goals, policies and methods. The modus
operandi for this type of study must include field-work, and often survey
work. A relevant part of the study must be an analysis of the economic,
political, and bureaucratic pressures operating upon the system and
which may tend to promote or defeat the policy objectives of the agency.
For these reasons, it would be irresponsible to propose any
appellate structure for any substantive subject except in the context of a
more comprehensive study of that subject.18 An analysis of the problems
of the system, the substantive law, the interests affected, the policy goals
and the institutional practices and pressures must come first. It is only in
that context that the structures for primary adjudication and for appeals
(if any) can be considered in a way that will enable the implications of
the choices to be understood. Recognition of appeals on the merits as a
discrete subject in law reform would invoke the methodologies of a bull
in a china shop.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The arguments relating to appeals on the merits have been
canvassed above, and it would be superfluous to repeat them. It may be
useful, however, to conclude by mentioning some of the reasons for
concern.
The legal profession has long espoused the protection of private
rights, and that ideology has done much to shape the approach of the
courts on judicial review. A proclaimed goal has been to constrain the
excess or abuse of public power. Today, however, at least in Canada, the
18 Such studies used to be undertaken by royal commissions, but that practice has become less
common.
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greatest problems in public administration reflect a failure to pursue
public policy objectives. These problems involve not the excess or abuse
of power, but inertia and underachievement through the underuse of
power. With regard to pollution control, for example, the need is for a
careful analysis of the restraints that curtail government action, be they
political, economic, bureaucratic, or legal restraints.
We live in a world from which species of animals are
disappearing every year. If this pattern continues, it can surely be only a
matter of time before the human race finds its place on the disappearing
list. If governments really are going to protect the health and survival of
the world's population, structural changes in public administration must
be made to increase controls. It is difficult to envisage any expansion of
appellate structures that is likely to be adopted in relation to pollution
that would not tend to aggravate the problem.
No doubt there are some subjects in which revisions of, or
additions to, appellate structures would be in the public interest; but the
matter should be approached cautiously, only in a study of a substantive
subject, and without any initial assumption that appeals are a good thing.
Any attempt to expand appeals on the merits by a broad-brush approach
would be irresponsible. Indeed, in relation to some subjects, human
survival may depend upon restraining rights of appeal, and a more
decisive assertion of what may seem to some like arbitrary power.

